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ABSTRACT. From the viewpoint of the independence axiom of expected
utility theory, an interesting empirical dynamic choice problem involves
the presence of a “global risk,” that is, a chance of losing everything
whichever safe or risky option is chosen. In this experimental study, par-
ticipants have to allocate real money between a safe and a risky pro-
ject. Treatment variable is the particular decision stage at which a global
risk is resolved: (i) before the investment decision; (ii) after the invest-
ment decision, but before the resolution of the decision risk; (iii) after
the resolution of the decision risk. The baseline treatment is without
global risk. Our goal is to investigate the isolation effect and the prin-
ciple of timing independence under the different timing options of the
global risk. In addition, we examine the role played by anticipated and
experienced emotions in the choice problem. Main ﬁndings are a viola-
tion of the isolation effect, and support for the principle of timing inde-
pendence. Although behavior across the different global risk cases shows
similarities, we observe clear differences in people’s affective responses.
This may be responsible for the conﬂicting results observed in earlier
experiments. Dependent on the timing of the global risk different combi-
nations of anticipated and experienced emotions inﬂuence decision mak-
ing.
KEY WORDS: anxiety, background risk, emotions, global-risk, invest-
ment, laboratory experiment, regret
JEL CLASSIFICATION: A12, C91, D81
1. INTRODUCTION
Real life situations of decision making under uncertainty, like
investment, often involve compound lotteries with multiple
options and a signiﬁcant timing element. In contrast, most
economic experiments that study such behavior in the lab are
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limited to simple, static, and binary lotteries. From the view-
point of the independence axiom of expected utility theory, an
interesting dynamic choice problem concerns the presence of
an independent “global risk,” that is, a chance of losing every-
thing whichever safe or risky option is chosen.1
Ample experimental evidence exists showing a behavioral
shift towards risk seeking if a common probability is fac-
tored into the lotteries of a binary choice problem—the com-
mon ratio effect (Allais, 1953; Camerer, 1995). Interestingly,
there is also some evidence suggesting that this shift does
not occur in case of compound lotteries where the com-
mon component of the risk of losing is presented separately
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Cubitt et al., 1998). This has
been explained by the isolation effect, according to which peo-
ple ignore (transparent) common components of alternatives.
In the experiments examining the isolation effect an individual
has to commit to a choice to be made conditional on a prior
act of nature (the resolution of the global risk). Cubitt et al.
(1998) compare this precommitment choice problem with the
case where the resolution of the global risk is preceding the
choice. They ﬁnd a signiﬁcant difference in behavior between
these two cases, violating the dynamic choice principle of tim-
ing independence. However, this does not exhaust the possibil-
ities for the timing of a global risk. Bosman and van Winden
(2005) experimentally investigate investment if the resolution
of the global risk takes place after (instead of before) the res-
olution of the risky option. Surprisingly, they ﬁnd that people
invest less than in the absence of a global risk, which violates
the isolation effect.
Due to the theoretical signiﬁcance of the independence
axiom, it is important to check the robustness of these ﬁnd-
ings and the underlying determinants. Regarding the latter, one
interesting factor pointed at in various theoretical analyses,
but typically not accounted for in economic experiments, con-
cerns the impact of affect (see Pope, 1995; Loewenstein et al.,
2001). In a number of theories of risky choice, the anticipa-
tion of future feelings is assumed to inﬂuence the behavior
of the decision makers, such as regret (Bell, 1982; Loomes
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and Sugden, 1982), disappointment (Bell, 1985; Loomes and
Sugden, 1986), and anxiety (Wu, 1999; Caplin and Leahy,
2001). It is an empirical question whether indeed emotions
are anticipated and taken into account and, if so, whether the
anticipation is correct (Zeelenberg, 1999). More particularly, it
is important to know which emotions are anticipated. In addi-
tion to anticipated emotions also experienced emotions can
inﬂuence decision making under risk. Feelings are frequently
claimed to inﬂuence investors (see e.g., Krugman, 2001; Sacco
et al., 2003 on the emotional impact of global terrorism
on investment). Good and bad moods appear to inﬂuence
risk behavior in laboratories (Isen, 2001; see also Kirchsteiger
et al., 2006) and in the real world (Kliger and Levy, 2003).
Furthermore, induced anxiety appears to increase individu-
als’ preferences for low-risk/low-reward options (Raghunathan
and Pham, 1999). If indeed the anticipation of emotional
states is not perfect, actually experienced emotions may inﬂu-
ence behavior in a way that is not foreseen by the decision
maker, facilitating time inconsistencies. To get to know these
effects, a thorough analysis of both anticipated and experi-
enced emotions related to decision making under risk and
uncertainty is needed.
The purpose of this experimental study is to investigate (1)
the isolation effect and timing independence under all possi-
ble timing options of a global risk, and (2) the role played
by anticipated and experienced emotions in the related choice
problems. Our main ﬁndings are a violation of the isolation
effect, which differs from the one observed by Bosman and
van Winden (2005), and support for the principle of timing
independence. Although behavior across the different global
risk cases shows similarities, we observe clear differences in
people’s affective responses which may be responsible for the
conﬂicting results observed in earlier experiments. Dependent
on the situation, different combinations of anticipated and
experienced emotions appear to inﬂuence decision-making.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
experimental design and procedures. Section 3 shows our
ﬁndings concerning investment behavior, affective responses,
252 ASTRID HOPFENSITZ AND FRANS A.A.M. VAN WINDEN
and the relation between the two. Section 4 addresses some
differences between our ﬁndings and earlier evidence using the
results of additional experiments. Section 5 concludes.
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES
2.1. Experimental design
Our baseline treatment concerns the following choice prob-
lem. Each participant in the experiment is endowed with an
amount of money z that he/she has to allocate (once and for
real) to two options, one of which is safe while the other
is risky. The amount allocated to the safe option is returned
with certainty, yielding neither gains nor losses. The risky
option returns 2.5 times the amount invested with probability
p=1/2, and returns nothing with probability (1−p)=1/2. In
the sequel, the probability p will be called the decision risk,
while only the money that is allocated to the risky option (x)
will be called investment.2
This Baseline treatment will be compared with several
other treatments where we add a variously timed global risk,
that is, a chance (q = 1/3) that the participant faces a zero
return from both options whatever the investment decision
was (implying zero earnings from the experiment). Three pos-
sibilities exist with respect to the timing of the resolution of
the global risk (for the decision trees, see Fig. 1):
(1) GR-Pre: the global risk is resolved before the investment
decision. If the risk materializes, the participant loses the
endowment and gets no further chance of gaining money.
(2) GR-Inter: the resolution of the global risk occurs after
the investment decision but before the resolution of the
decision risk (p). If the risk materializes, the participant
loses the endowment allocated to the two options, without
learning the outcome of the decision risk.
(3) GR-Post: the global risk is resolved after the investment
decision and the resolution of the decision risk. If the risk
materializes, all the returns from both the safe option and
the risky option are lost.
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Figure 1. Decision trees for Baseline, GR-Inter, GR-Pre, and GR-Post.
According to classical expected utility theory (EU), the
existence of a global risk should not inﬂuence investment.
Theories including a probability weighting function, e.g., rank-
dependent utility theory (RDU) and cumulative prospect the-
ory (CPT) (Quiggin, 1982; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992),
can predict changes in behavior under global risk. In these
theories the common risk does not cancel out and using an
inverse-S shaped probability weighting function, we should
observe more investment under global risk. This being the
case if the reference point is taken as either zero or z. Both
RDU and CPT would predict no difference between GR-Inter
and GR-Post. In case of GR-Pre, according to CPT (e.g.,
for a loss aversion parameter of λ = 2) we might expect less
investment compared to Baseline if a “lucky draw” will shift
the reference point from zero to z. If we allow for differ-
ent probability weighting functions, dependent on the affective
strength of the situation (Rottenstreich and Hsee, 2001), we
might expect more investment for the more affect-rich situa-
tion. Finally dependent on the chosen utility function, RDU
and CPT can predict intermediate investment while classical
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Figure 2. Time-line of emotion measures and their respective point of reference.
EU (of wealth) predicts full investment. For a more detailed
discussion of the application of these theories to our invest-
ment situation, see the formal discussion in Bosman and van
Winden (2005).
As mentioned in the introduction, the existing experimen-
tal evidence is puzzling. While some results are in line with
EU, showing no effect, other results have shown that, under
certain conditions, global risk can lead to more investment
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), less investment (Bosman and
van Winden, 2005) or leave investment unchanged (Cubitt
et al., 1998). Our conjecture is, that different affective reac-
tions might be held responsible for this.
To investigate the occurrence and inﬂuence of emotions dur-
ing the experiment both experienced and anticipated emotions
are measured, using self-reports.3 The role of the following
emotions is investigated: anxiety, regret, rejoicing, disappoint-
ment, hope, irritation, surprise, sadness, and happiness. We
further measure anxiety as a trait because of its hypothesized
importance in case of uncertainty. For an overview of the
kind and timing of these measures, see Table I and Fig. 2,
respectively.
To gauge anxiety we use the well known Spielberger state/
trait-anxiety inventory, abbreviated as STAI (Spielberger et al.,
1970). It is considered to be an “excellent measure of both
types [state and trait] of anxiety” (Kline, 1993) and is widely
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TABLE I
Emotion measures used in the experiment
A. Anxiety (see Appendix A.1.1)
Variable Moment of measure Comments
ANXIETY-
trait
Before start of experi-
ment
General disposition to anxi-
ety
ANXIETY-1 Before decision was
made
Experienced anxiety prior to
decision
ANXIETY-2 After decision was made Experienced anxiety after
decision
B. Regret, rejoicing and disappointment (see Appendix A.2)
B.1. Anticipated regret and rejoicing
Variable Moment of measure Comments
REGRET-A After decision was made Regret as motivation for
project A
REGRET-B After decision was made Regret as motivation for
project B
REJOICE-A After decision was made Rejoicing as motivation for
project A
REJOICE-B After decision was made Rejoicing as motivation for
project B
B.2. Relative measures of regret (rejoicing) and disappointment
Variable Moment of measure Comments
REGRET-R After decision was made REGRET-A - REGRET-B
REJOICE-R After decision was made REJOICE-B - REJOICE-A
REGRET-E After decision was made Estimation of regret
DISAPP-E After decision was made Estimation of disappoint-
ment
REGRET-X After outcome was
known
Experienced regret after
outcome
DISAPP-X After outcome was
known.
Experienced disappointment
after outcome
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TABLE I
Continued
C. General emotions (see Appendix A.3.2)
Variable Moment of measure Comments
EMOTION After decision was made Importance of emotions
for decision
HOPE-1
IRRITATE-1
Before decision was
made
Experienced hope (irrita-
tion) before the decision
used. A general score is computed from the detailed answers
to a series of questions (see Appendix A.1.1), which represents
either the general disposition for anxiety (trait scale) or the
anxiety experienced at the moment when the questionnaire is
ﬁlled out (state scale). In the experiment, trait anxiety (ANX-
IETY-trait) is measured before participants get into the lab,
while state anxiety is measured immediately before (ANXI-
ETY-1) and after (ANXIETY-2) the investment decision.
Based on the existing psychological evidence a negative
inﬂuence of (anticipated) state anxiety on risk taking is pre-
dicted. Furthermore, as people with a stronger disposition for
anxiety are more likely to experience and to anticipate this
emotion, greater risk aversion is expected from participants
with a higher anxiety trait score.
Regret, rejoicing, and disappointment are measured in three
different ways (for details, see Appendix A.2). First, we ask
for the regret and rejoicing participants anticipated when
making their investment decision4 (represented by the vari-
ables REGRET-A [B] and REJOICE-A [B] and the rela-
tive measures REGRET-R=REGRET-A - REGRET-B, and
REJOICE-R=REJOICE-B - REJOICE-A).5 Where the A [B]
indicates that these emotions might lead to more investment
in option A [B]. Then, participants are asked to imagine a
hypothetical scenario where they lose their invested money
because of a negative outcome of the risky project. Partici-
pants have to indicate their estimated level of regret
DYNAMIC CHOICE, INDEPENDENCE AND EMOTIONS 257
(REGRET-E) and disappointment (DISAPP-E) using an indi-
rect measure adopted from Zeelenberg et al. (1998). The items
of this measure have been found to be signiﬁcantly corre-
lated with the two emotions. Because of the quick succession
of the two questions regarding regret, this indirect measure
is chosen, to minimize the chance that participants try to
be consistent in their answers. Finally, experienced regret
(REGRET-X) and disappointment (DISAPP-X) are measured
when the outcome of both risks is known. These allow us
to investigate how well people forecast their future emotional
state (Loewenstein and Schkade, 1999).
Before the investment decision is taken, we also measure
the experience of some other emotions (see Appendix A.3),
in particular hope and irritation because of their speciﬁc rel-
evance for the situation at hand (HOPE-1, IRRITATE-1).
Although the valence of these experienced emotions is
different, we expect both of them to have a positive effect on
investment. However if irritation is not of the aggressive type,
but related to anxiety it would rather follow the latter’s action
tendency of promoting risk aversion; (see Leith and Baumeis-
ter, 1996; MacLeod and Byrne, 1996).
Because participants take only one decision, we will ana-
lyze the role of emotions in the different treatments from
an inter-individual (between-subjects) perspective. Although
a within-subjects design is attractive to examine treatment
effects, in this case we prefer a between-subjects design to
avoid any confounding effects of the decision problem6 and
spillover effects of experienced emotions.
2.2. Experimental procedures
Upon entering the reception room, participants were handed
the ANXIETY-trait questionnaire, which they ﬁlled out in
quiet. When everybody had ﬁnished, the participants were
requested to randomly draw a seat number for the labora-
tory and to put a sticker with that number on the (nameless)
questionnaire before handing it in and entering the lab. In
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the analysis responses to the questionnaire could be linked
to data obtained in the lab (only) through the seat number.
In this way, anonymity was maintained. In the lab, each par-
ticipant received an envelope with 15 euro in coins and bills
as working money for the experiment. Participants were told
that if they would lose some of their money in the experi-
ment they would have to pay back the amount of the loss
after the session (keeping the rest), while earnings in excess of
their working money would be paid out to them on top of the
15 euro. After checking the content of their envelope, partic-
ipants received the instructions, which were handed out and
read aloud by the experimenter (for a translation, see Appen-
dix B.2). In the instructions participants were informed that
they would have to allocate their working money to two pro-
jects, one of which had a certain return (no gains, no losses),
while the other had a probability of p = 1/2 to return 2.5
times the amount invested and a probability of (1−p)=1/2 to
return nothing. Furthermore, they were told that they would
have to determine the outcome of the risky project themselves,
by rolling a dice under supervision. In the treatments with
the global risk (GR-Pre, GR-Inter, and GR-Post) they were
additionally informed that they were to face a risk of q =1/3
to lose all their money from the experiment (see Appendix
B.1.2). The resolution of this global risk would again be deter-
mined by themselves, by rolling another dice under supervi-
sion. After an opportunity for raising questions, participants
went individually through the computerized questions of the
experiment.
The ﬁrst set of questions concerned the intensity with
which they experienced the emotions of anxiety (ANXIETY-
1), hope (HOPE-1), and irritation (IRRITATE-1), at that very
moment. Subsequently, they were asked to ﬁll in the amounts
of money they would like to allocate to the projects A and
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B (the fraction invested in project B will be labeled INVEST-
MENT). The amounts could be any multiple of 50 eurocent
and had to add up to 15 euro. In the treatment GR-Pre this
was preceded by the dice roll resolving the global risk.7 After
the investment decision, participants were asked to record the
anxiety they experienced now that they had made their invest-
ment decision, but before knowing the outcome of the still
to be resolved risk(s) (ANXIETY-2). This was followed by
the question whether they had taken their future emotions
into account when they made their decision (EMOTION)
and, more speciﬁcally, to which extent the anticipation of
regret and rejoicing inﬂuenced their decision (REGRET-A[B],
REJOICE-A[B]). Next, they were asked to estimate the extent
to which they would experience regret and disappointment in
case they lost their money in the risky project (REGRET-E,
DISAPP-E). Finally, participants were requested to conﬁrm
their decision, with an option to alter it if they wanted.8
The experimenters went then through the lab to have the
private decision risk resolved by the dice roll and to record
the result. In the treatment GR-Inter this was preceded by the
dice roll resolving the global risk, while in GR-Post this hap-
pened after the resolution of the decision risk. Note, however,
that in GR-Inter the decision risk was not resolved for those
who lost everything. The experiment ended with a debrieﬁng
questionnaire including the question whether the participant
experienced regret (REGRET-X) about the decision taken or
disappointment (DISAPP-X) about the outcome. Participants
were then paid out in private. If earnings were less than
their working money they were required to pay back the
difference.
The experiment took about one hour. All sessions took
place in the CREED-laboratory of the University of Amster-
dam. Participants were recruited from various ﬁelds of study,
and in total 192 students participated in the experiment. They
received 2.50 euro as show-up fee, and on average their total
earnings were 16.80 euro (approximately $ 20.20).
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3. BEHAVIORAL RESULTS
3.1. Compound independence and the isolation effect
An important implication of the independence axiom of
rational choice theory, when applied to two-stage lotteries, is
compound independence. This axiom states that: the two-stage
lottery A yielding with probability α a ticket for lottery X
and with probability 1−α a ticket for lottery Z, is preferred
to the two-stage lottery B, which is the same as A with Y
instead of X, if and only if the one-stage lottery X is pre-
ferred to the one-stage lottery Y (i.e., A = (X,α;Z, (1− α))
B = (Y,α;Z, (1 − α)) if and only if X Y ; see Segal (1990)).
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) found experimental support
for this axiom, using a two-stage choice problem similar to
our treatment GR-Inter (with the resolution of the global risk
resolved after the decision is made, but before the resolution
of the decision risk). For explanation, they suggested the exis-
tence of an editing phase in decision making where (transpar-
ent) common components of alternatives are cancelled - the
isolation effect. Several other experimental studies reported
corroborating evidence for this effect (Tversky and Kahne-
man, 1981, 1986; Conlisk, 1989; Bernasconi, 1994). Because
these studies either used hypothetical payoffs or a random lot-
tery incentive system, one may be sceptical concerning the evi-
dence.9 However Cubitt et al. (1998), using monetary incen-
tives in a carefully designed experiment, arrived at the same
conclusion, that is, that the isolation effect holds.
In all these experimental studies people are confronted with
a two-stage choice problem similar to GR-Inter, but they are
restricted to a binary choice (for either the safe or the risky
option). Our design differs in this respect, by allowing partic-
ipants to allocate their money to the two projects in whatever
proportion they like, which resembles more the adjustment of
a portfolio of assets. Therefore, we focus ﬁrst on the treat-
ments Baseline and GR-Inter, to investigate the robustness of
the isolation effect. For the decision trees of the respective
choice problems we refer to Fig. 1.
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Figure 3. INVESTMENT in Baseline and GR-Inter.
3.1.1. Investment: GR-Inter vs. Baseline
Figure 3 presents the distributions of the investment choices.
The distributions are clearly different. Whereas Baseline shows
a mode at half of the money being invested, the mode in
GR-Inter is at full investment. Furthermore, mean investment
is 27% higher in GR-Inter (0.662 vs. 0.521), and substantially
more participants invest all their money in that treatment
(23% vs. 5%). Tests10 corroborate that the distributions are
different, with investment being higher in GR-Inter (Mann–
Whitney, p=0.011; Kolmogorov–Smirnov, p=0.012).11
Thus, even though we took great care in making the global
risk very transparent (see Appendix B), we ﬁnd evidence
against compound independence and the isolation effect.
Result 1. In GR-Inter investment is higher and more extreme
than in Baseline, violating compound independence. In contrast
to other studies we ﬁnd no support for the isolation effect.
Although these results cannot be explained by EU, they
can be explained by RDU and CPT (excluding the isolation
effect). Whether these theories can also explain the results of
the remaining treatments, GR-Pre and GR-Post, we will see
below. We ﬁrst examine the role of emotions in Baseline and
GR-Inter.
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3.1.2. The role of emotions
The question we want to address here is whether the invest-
ment level is related to emotional disposition and anticipated
and experienced emotions when the decision was made. To
that purpose, we employ a (Tobit) regression model with
INVESTMENT as the dependent variable, and as indepen-
dent variables: trait anxiety (ANXIETY-trait), anticipated
rejoicing (REJOICE-R),12 experienced anxiety (ANXIETY-1),
hope (HOPE-1), and irritation (IRRITATE-1).13 Based on the
evidence referred to above, we hypothesize a negative impact
of trait/state anxiety and a positive impact of rejoicing, while
no speciﬁc effect is predicted for hope. The effect of irritation
is expected to be positive, unless it is a correlate of anxiety, in
which case the predicted effect is negative.
As Table II shows, very similar regression results are
obtained for the two treatments. More speciﬁcally, none of
the estimated coefﬁcients is different across treatments (F -test,
p > 0.299). Joint estimation, using a treatment dummy for
GR-Inter, shows that GR-Inter furthers investment (dummy
coefﬁcient: +0.130, p = 0.024). Our hypotheses concerning the
impact of emotions are partially conﬁrmed. Interestingly,
hope shows a positive effect. Although perhaps intuitive, note
that a relationship between risk attitude and hopefulness
could not be conﬁrmed by Chew and Ho (1994), while no
clear action tendency seems related to the emotion of hope
in psychology (Lazarus, 1999). As predicted, anticipation of
more relative rejoicing leads to higher investment. Substitut-
ing REGRET-R for REJOICE-R leads to an opposite and
weaker effect (coefﬁcient: −0.066, p = 0.026). Trait and state
anxiety do not show a signiﬁcant impact on investment. The
two variables are strongly correlated (Spearman: 0.558, p =
0.000). However, even if one of them is left out no signiﬁ-
cance is obtained. This is surprising in light of the psychologi-
cal evidence that anxiety inﬂuences risk taking. We will return
to this issue below. Interestingly, irritation is correlated with
state anxiety (Spearman: 0.244, p = 0.034) and shows a nega-
tive impact on investment.
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TABLE II
Censored tobit regressions of investment on emotions
Baseline
Number of obs 37
LR χ2(5) 22.89
Prob >χ2 0.000
Cox Snell R2 0.461
INVESTMENT t1 Coef. Std. Err. p> |t |
ANXIETY-trait −0.004 0.005 0.433
ANXIETY-1 0.003 0.005 0.532
HOPE-1 0.249 0.057 0.000
IRRITATE-1 −0.100 0.052 0.062
REJOICE-R 0.108 0.031 0.001
Intercept −0.075 0.257 0.773
2 obs. left-censored; 2 obs. right-censored
GR-Inter Number of obs 39
LR χ2(5) 20.46
Prob >χ2 0.001
Cox Snell R2 0.408
INVESTMENT t1 Coef. Std. Err. p> |t |
ANXIETY-trait −0.003 0.007 0.728
ANXIETY-1 0.000 0.005 0.952
HOPE-1 0.169 0.067 0.016
IRRITATE-1 −0.121 0.050 0.022
REJOICE-R 0.126 0.038 0.002
Intercept 0.431 0.313 0.178
1 obs. left-censored; 9 obs. right-censored
Thus, except for the level shift in investment, it appears
that emotions impact investment in a very similar way in
Baseline and GR-Inter. One of the reasons why investment
is higher in GR-Inter is that experienced hope, which has
the strongest inﬂuence in our regression model, is higher in
GR-Inter.14 Anticipated rejoicing does not differ and irrita-
tion differs marginally.15 An indicator of higher arousal in
GR-Inter concerns experienced anxiety when corrected for
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TABLE III
Averages of experienced and estimated emotions (std. dev. in parentheses)
Baseline GR-Pre GR-Inter GR-Post
ANXIETY-trait 35.43 34.42 35.10 37.24
(8.26) (8.84) (7.18) (7.72)
ANXIETY-1 35.76 40.13 40.49 38.14
(7.29) (10.08) (11.94) (8.48)
ANXIETY-difference 0.32 5.71 5.39 0.91
(7.40) (9.55) (10.28) (9.14)
HOPE-1 2.95 3.35 3.28 3.02
(0.57) (0.64) (0.65) (0.64)
IRRITATE-1 1.46 1.40 1.85 1.57
(0.65) (0.64) (0.93) (0.80)
REGRET-A 2.65 2.70 2.80 2.75
(1.17) (1.18) (1.15) (1.11)
REJOICE-A 2.47 1.97 2.30 2.29
(1.18) (1.01) (1.08) (0.95)
REGRET-B 2.18 2.00 2.35 2.58
(1.13) (1.08) (1.14) (0.93)
REJOICE-B 2.88 3.03 2.75 3.17
(1.11) (1.01) (1.21) (0.82)
REGRET-E 6.16 5.42 5.69 5.98
(2.15) (2.28) (2.18) (2.05)
DISAPP-E 6.86 6.77 7.18 7.02
(2.17) (2.15) (1.73) (1.92)
REGRET-X 1.57 1.42 1.51 1.36
(0.80) (0.71) (0.76) (0.53)
DISAPP-X 1.92 2.13 2.49 2.40
(1.16) (1.18) (1.27) (1.19)
trait anxiety (i.e., ANXIETY-1-ANXIETY-trait) which is
higher in GR-Inter.16 There is some psychological evidence
concerning lotteries (albeit with hypothetical payoffs) suggest-
ing that arousal is related to risk seeking (Mano, 1994; Leith
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TABLE IV
Correlations of emotions
A. (Spearman) correlation coefﬁcients of investment with:
REGRET-A REJOICE-A
Baseline −0.554 p = 0.021 −0.377 p = 0.136
GR-Pre −0.432 p = 0.008 −0.304 p = 0.068
GR-Inter −0.528 p = 0.017 −0.707 p = 0.001
GR-Post −0.249 p = 0.241 −0.277 p = 0.190
REGRET-B REJOICE-B
Baseline −0.235 p = 0.364 0.134 p = 0.609
GR-Pre −0.303 p = 0.068 0.440 p = 0.006
GR-Inter 0.222 p = 0.347 0.383 p = 0.096
GR-Post 0.070 p = 0.744 0.530 p = 0.008
B. (Spearman) correlation coefﬁcients of estimated and experienced:
Disappointment Regret
Baseline 0.200 p = 0.457 0.660 p = 0.005
GR-Pre −0.031 p = 0.885 0.410 p = 0.042
GR-Inter 0.252 p = 0.430 0.537 p = 0.072
GR-Post 0.349 p = 0.324 0.618 p = 0.057
and Baumeister, 1996). If so, then this would help explain the
upward shift in investment in GR-Inter.
The next result summarizes our ﬁndings.
Result 2. From a multiple (Tobit) regression model it appears
that emotions have a clear and similar impact on investment in
Baseline and GR-Inter. The experience of hope and anticipated
rejoicing further investment. Anticipated regret and anticipated
rejoicing are correlated, with the former having an opposite and
weaker effect on investment. Neither trait anxiety nor state anx-
iety impact investment. However, the experience of irritation,
which positively correlates with state anxiety, has a negative inﬂu-
ence. The higher intensity of hope and arousal observed in GR-
Inter helps explain the higher level of investment in this treatment.
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3.2. Timing independence
According to Cubitt et al. (1998) the principle of timing
independence requires that “an agent, if required to precom-
mit to an action to be taken conditional on a prior act of
nature, precommits to the action which would be chosen if the
moment of choice was delayed until after that act of nature.”
If this principle of rational choice theory holds, people con-
fronted with choice problems similar to GR-Inter and GR-Pre
(see the decision trees in Fig. 1) should show identical invest-
ment behavior. However, in their experimental study Cubitt
et al. (1998) ﬁnd that the principle is violated, even though
no signiﬁcant difference is observed between (in our termi-
nology) Baseline and GR-Inter and between Baseline and
GR-Pre, respectively.17 The violation is due to the combined
effect of more risk seeking when the global risk is resolved
after the investment decision and less risk seeking when it is
resolved before this decision is taken, compared to the base-
line without global risk. Our treatments Baseline, GR-Inter,
and GR-Pre are equivalent in terms of decision trees, except
that we do not restrict decision making to a binary choice.
Therefore, we want to see whether the principle of timing
independence is also violated in our case.
3.2.1. Investment: GR-Inter vs. GR-Pre
As announced in the instructions to the participants (see
Appendix B.2), in treatment GR-Pre the global risk was
resolved before the investment decision. Those who could con-
tinue were, on the face of it, presented with the same decision
problem as participants in Baseline. The others, for whom the
global risk draw was unfavorable, were asked to answer the
questions hypothetically, with no money to be earned. Fig. 4
presents the distribution of investment in GR-Pre (for those
that could continue because of a lucky draw).18
The distribution seems similar to GR-Inter and indeed, sta-
tistically, no difference in investment is found (Mann–Whitney,
p = 0.247; Kolmogorov–Smirnov, p = 0.312). Thus, contrary
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Figure 4. INVESTMENT in GR-Pre.
to Cubitt et al. (1998), we ﬁnd no evidence of a violation
of timing independence. In line with the results obtained
by these authors, we also ﬁnd no difference in investment
between GR-Pre and Baseline (Mann–Whitney, p = 0.117;
Kolmogorov–Smirnov, p=0.454).
Result 3. Investment in GR-Pre is similar to GR-Inter and to
Baseline. Contrary to Cubitt et al. (1998), no violation of tim-
ing independence is observed.
Because RDU and CPT can also explain these outcomes,
they survive as explanatory theories of our results so far. Note
with respect to CPT that one has to assume here that no
signiﬁcant shift in reference point has occurred in GR-Pre
(from 0 to z), because this should have induced less invest-
ment, according to this theory.
We want to point out some (qualitative) aspects differenti-
ating the three treatments, which adds a caveat to Result 3.
This concerns the shape of the investment distributions. The
frequency of full investment in GR-Pre (23%), is identical to
GR-Inter (23%) but remarkably higher than the frequency in
Baseline (5%; Pearson χ2, p<0.029). Moreover, in GR-Pre as
well as in GR-Inter full investment is also the mode. Another
concern relates to the role of emotions to which we turn next.
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3.2.2. The role of emotions
Remarkably, the (Tobit) regression model of investment, which
was successfully employed for Baseline and GR-Inter, fails
to reach signiﬁcance for GR-Pre (χ2 = 0.152; see Table V
in Appendix C). Only anticipated rejoicing appears to have
a (positive) effect on investment, but weaker than in the
previous two treatments (coefﬁcient REJOICE-R: +0.080,
p=0.024). Thus, even though, equality of the investment dis-
tributions cannot be rejected, from an emotion point of view
these treatments nevertheless appear to be different. Three
other differences show up when we take a closer look at
the remaining emotion variables of the model: anxiety, hope,
and irritation. First, while little variation is observed in trait-
anxiety,19 more anxiety is experienced in GR-Pre than in
Baseline, as was found for GR-Inter.20 Apparently, global risk
elicits greater anxiety, independent of whether its resolution
just happened or is about to take place soon. A similar differ-
ence is observed for hope, with more hope being experienced
in both global risk treatments.21 As discussed for GR-Inter,
higher arousal may have positively inﬂuenced investment in
GR-Pre. These additional ﬁndings in turn suggest that, com-
pared to Baseline, the global risk treatments are more alike in
this respect.
Result 4. GR-Pre cannot be explained with the regression model
that is successfully employed for Baseline and GR-Inter, show-
ing that emotions are not a mere correlate of investment. Only
anticipated rejoicing shows again a positive (but weaker) effect
on investment.
While GR-Pre and GR-Inter resemble each other in some
emotional respects, they differ in others. This restricts our
conﬁdence in statistical results ignoring emotions. Factors
inﬂuencing emotional intensity (like vividness or closeness)
that have not been controlled for in experimental studies so
far may have affected the results. This sets an important
agenda for future research.
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Another unexpected ﬁnding concerns predictions from the
mood maintenance hypothesis (see e.g., Isen and Simmonds,
1978). According to this hypothesis people may become more
risk averse when they are happy, in order not to risk loos-
ing their good mood (which has a positive hedonic value). In
case of GR-Pre this would suggest that people being happy
after surviving the global risk would invest less. Incidentally,
this might help explain the violation of timing independence
observed by Cubitt et al. (1998), because they indeed ﬁnd that
investment is less when the global risk is resolved before mak-
ing the choice between the safe and the risky option. Unfor-
tunately, they do not have the required data on affect to test
this. Surprisingly, we do not ﬁnd that people with a lucky
draw in GR-Pre are happier.22 Moreover, happiness is not cor-
related with investment (Spearman, 0.172, p=0.244).23
3.3. Adding GR-Post
Our main ﬁndings so far are a violation of the isolation effect
(with more investment in GR-Inter than in Baseline), sup-
port for timing independence (GR-Pre vs. GR-Inter), and evi-
dence that, affectively, people do not experience the various
(global risk) treatments in the same way. Furthermore, RDU
and CPT survived as explanatory theories. We will now check
the robustness of these ﬁndings by adding the results of our
remaining treatment GR-Post (for its decision tree, see Fig. 1).
Before we do so, we ﬁrst extend Cubitt et al.’s deﬁnition of
timing independence to include the new timing of the global
risk: an agent, if required to precommit to an action to be
taken conditional on a prior act of nature, precommits to the
action which would be chosen if the moment of choice was
delayed until after that act of nature or if the act of nature
were to be delayed till after the outcome of the action.
Furthermore, note that from the perspective of RDU and
CPT investment in GR-Post should be the same as in
GR-Inter. This suggests that we should also observe higher
investment in GR-Post, compared to Baseline.24 On the other
hand, Bosman and van Winden (2005) found lower investment
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Figure 5. INVESTMENT in GR-Post.
in their treatment where the global risk was resolved after the
resolution of the decision risk, a result that ﬂies in the face
of both RDU and CPT. Because our design seems to differ
only in the use of more extensive measures of emotions and in
using euros instead of guilders, a similar outcome is expected
for GR-Post.
3.3.1. Investment across treatments
Figure 5 presents the distribution of investment in GR-Post.
Surprisingly, in our case, investment is clearly not smaller
when compared to Baseline (see Fig. 3). Although mean
investment is even higher in GR-Post (0.62 vs. 0.52), statisti-
cally, we ﬁnd only some weak evidence of a difference with
Baseline, and no evidence of a difference with GR-Inter and
GR-Pre (see Tables VIII and IX in Appendix C for the statis-
tics, concerning all treatments). Thus, also with this treatment
included, we ﬁnd no violation of timing independence.
Result 5. Including GR-Post, we ﬁnd no evidence of a difference
in the distribution of investment between the global risk treat-
ments GR-Pre, GR-Inter and GR-Post, supporting timing inde-
pendence. However, as observed for GR-Pre (Result 3), there is
also no (clear) evidence of a difference between Baseline and
GR-Post in contrast with what is observed for GR-Inter (Result
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1). It appears that GR-Pre and GR-Post are distribution-wise in
between Baseline and GR-Inter.
Although, statistically, we observe only a difference between
Baseline and GR-Inter, remarkably, in all treatments involving
global risk we see a very similar proportion of full invest-
ment (circa 23%), which is higher than in Baseline (Pearson
χ2, p < 0.029).25 If we restrict our attention to partici-
pants that invested only part of their working money (i.e.,
INVESTMENT <1) we still observe some tendency towards
larger investment in GR-Inter (Mann–Whitney, p = 0.122;
Kolmogorov–Smirnov, p = 0.140), and no difference between
Baseline and the remaining global risk treatments. The higher
observed means in these treatments are mainly due to differ-
ences in participants choosing full instead of intermediate
investment.
Next, we will again turn to the role of emotions to exam-
ine how people affectively experience the timing of the global
risk, which can help improve our understanding of the behav-
ioral results.
3.3.2. Comparing the role of emotions
It turns out that our Tobit model of investment — success-
ful in explaining investment in Baseline and GR-Inter, but not
in GR-Pre — is also not signiﬁcant for GR-Post (χ2 = 0.269;
see Appendix C). The only coefﬁcient showing (weak) signiﬁ-
cance relates to experienced irritation, and has a positive sign
(coefﬁcient: +0.130, p = 0.078).26 Also, only in this treatment
there is no clear effect of anticipated rejoicing as measured by
REJOICE-R (p=0.119). We will return to this below.
For a better understanding of the differences across treat-
ments, we compare the role played by emotions in the various
treatments (see Tables III and IV).
One of our hypothesis is that the presence of global risk
will lead to higher experienced anxiety, compared to Base-
line. While little variation is observed in trait anxiety,27 expe-
rienced anxiety is indeed higher in GR-Pre, and GR-Inter
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(see Table III). Controlling for trait-anxiety by looking at
ANXIETY-difference (= ANXIETY-1 - ANXIETY-trait),
more anxiety is experienced in GR-Pre (Mann–Whitney,
p < 0.028) and GR-Inter (Mann–Whitney, p < 0.134, com-
pared to Baseline and GR-Post). Somewhat surprisingly,
this does not apply to GR-Post, where the resolution of
the threat to lose all income is to take place at the very
end of the experiment. This suggests that anxiety is par-
ticularly elicited if the global risk is either just experienced
or is to be experienced in the near(er) future. A similar
outcome is obtained for hope. The experience of hope is
higher in GR-Pre (Mann–Whitney, p < 0.016) and GR-Inter
(Mann–Whitney, p < 0.075), compared to Baseline and GR-
Post. This suggests that even though behavior may seem
similar in the presence of global risk, treatments are affec-
tively appraised as being different. Whereas GR-Pre and
GR-Inter clearly differ regarding the prospect of the global
risk, they elicit hope and anxiety to a very similar degree.
In remarkable contrast, GR-Post appears to differ from
GR-Inter in this respect, even though the former seems only a
slight variation of the latter (which is neglected by RDU and
CPT).
An interesting further difference between the treatments is
found with respect to the emotions regret, rejoicing, and dis-
appointment.
Since in GR-Inter global risk is resolved before the decision
risk, subjects will not learn in 1/3 of the cases if they made
the “right” decision or not. Thus, on average, the anticipa-
tion of regret and rejoicing may be expected to be less related
to investment in GR-Inter than in GR-Post. Anticipation of
regret (rejoicing) was measured through questions about the
importance of avoiding (seeking) regret (rejoicing) when mak-
ing the investment decision. For example, regarding project A
participants were requested to indicate to what extent the fol-
lowing statements were applicable to them (similar questions
for project B; see Appendix A):
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1. I did not put more money in B, because I did not want
to feel really bad when project B returns nothing (loses).
[REGRET-A]
2. I did not put less money in A, because I will feel really
good if project B returns nothing (loses). [REJOICE-A].
From the answers we can see whether participants took the
possibility into account of (not) having to experience regret
(rejoicing). Our ﬁrst observation is that the average scores for
these questions are not different across treatments.28 In all
treatments, people report to have thought to an equal degree
about regret and rejoicing. However, not in all treatments
these answers are similarly related to their investment deci-
sions. Correlation coefﬁcients show that the focus of regret
and rejoicing differed (see Table IV). For all treatments we
observe that REGRET-A is stronger correlated with invest-
ment than REGRET-B. Thus, insofar as regret is concerned
people always seem to focus more on the safe project. Regard-
ing rejoicing, though, there are variations across treatments.
In both Baseline and GR-Inter, REJOICE-A is stronger cor-
related with investment than REJOICE-B, suggesting that in
these treatments the focus is more on the safe project when it
comes to rejoicing. This is in contrast with both GR-Pre and
GR-Post where rejoicing is mostly related to investment in
project B. Furthermore, note that in Baseline only REGRET-
A is correlated with investment, whereas in all treatments
with global risk (also) some correlation with REJOICE-B is
observed.
We further ﬁnd that regret is mostly correlated with invest-
ment in treatments where these emotions can be prominent
at the very end of the experiment. This singles out GR-Post,
because here it is the emotion of disappointment (about the
resolution of the global risk) that is prominent at the end.
The “peak-end” rule of memory may play a role here (see
Kahneman et al., 1993; Schreiber and Kahneman, 2000; Kah-
neman, 2000). This rule refers to the ﬁnding that strongest
intensity and ﬁnal experience deﬁne the memory of the util-
ity of a situation. If this effect does not only exist for the cre-
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ation of memory, but also for the anticipation of utility, this
might explain our ﬁndings. Comparing the situations of GR-
Inter and GR-Post, through the timing of the global risk, the
former would generate more anxiety and hope and a stronger
focus on regret and rejoicing than the latter. Which is what
we observe. Although GR-Inter and GR-Post are equivalent
in RDU and CPT, affectively they are experienced as being
different.
Responses to the question (posed after the investment deci-
sion) how one would feel if the invested money would be
lost with the resolution of the decision risk show that esti-
mated regret and disappointment for this scenario (REGRET-
E and DISAPP-E) do not differ across treatments (Table III).
Estimated regret is in all treatments correlated with actually
experienced regret if the invested money was indeed lost.29
Because the loss of invested money should be less related to
disappointment, it is not surprising that in all treatments we
ﬁnd no correlation of estimated and experienced disappoint-
ment (see Table IV: B).30 Interestingly, in all cases experienced
regret is overestimated.31
The next result summarizes our ﬁndings concerning
GR-Post.
Result 6. As holds for GR-Pre, investment in GR-Post cannot
be explained with the regression model that helps explain behav-
ior in Baseline and GR-Inter. At the individual emotion level,
anticipated rejoicing is again found to be positively correlated
with investment, but in this case only if restricted to the rejoic-
ing anticipated from taking risk (REJOICE-B). Furthermore,
experienced irritation appears to be positively related to invest-
ment, in contrast with Baseline and GR-Inter (negative corre-
lation) and GR-Pre (no correlation). The experienced amount
of hope and anxiety is more like in Baseline than in GR-Pre
and GR-Inter where the resolution of the global risk precedes
the resolution of the decision risk.
The ﬁndings of this section can be summarized as follows.
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SUMMARY
• While compound independence cannot be rejected in GR-
Post, the isolation effect is violated in GR-Inter.
• Timing independence cannot be rejected.
• Full investment seems higher in the presence of global
risk.
• The same affect model helps explain investment in Base-
line and GR-Inter, showing similar coefﬁcients for antici-
pated rejoicing (+), experienced hope (+), and experienced
irritation (-).
• Affect functions differently in GR-Pre and GR-Post. Only
anticipated rejoicing is (positively) correlated with invest-
ment in both. In addition, experienced irritation is found
to be correlated with investment in GR-Post, but with a
positive sign.
• On average, across treatments, participants are similarly
motivated by anticipated regret and rejoicing, but the rela-
tion with investment differs. Another indicator showing
that, affectively, treatments are appraised as being differ-
ent is that the experience of hope and anxiety is of higher
intensity in GR-Pre and GR-Inter where a global risk
(arguably the more dramatic risk) is present but resolved
before the resolution of the decision risk.
• Estimated regret from a bad outcome of the decision risk
does not differ across treatments. The regret that is actu-
ally experienced is overestimated.
4. DISCUSSION AND FURTHER EVIDENCE
Our results are surprisingly different from the ﬁndings of the
two most related studies: Cubitt et al., 1998 and Bosman
and van Winden (2005). In contrast with the former study,
we ﬁnd evidence against the isolation effect, but not against
the principle of timing independence. Furthermore, we do not
ﬁnd that people invest less in GR-Post, compared to Base-
line, which contrasts with the latter study. How to explain
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these behavioral differences? Because of our multiple ﬁndings
that (anticipated and experienced) emotions play a role in
the investment decision, we conjecture that factors inﬂuencing
emotional intensity (like vividness or closeness), which have
not been controlled for in these studies, may have affected the
results. To substantiate this claim we will focus on the differ-
ence between our ﬁndings and those of Bosman and van Win-
den (in the sequel, indicated as BvW), concerning GR-Post.
Two potentially important issues will be addressed: the inﬂu-
ence of emotion measures and the amount of money that is
at stake.32
As acknowledged in the psychological literature (e.g., Lerner
and Keltner, 2001), emotion measures may inﬂuence affect,
and thereby behavior, by inducing people to focus on their
emotional experience. Because only in our study emotion
measures were applied before the investment decision was
made,33 this may partly explain the different results. For
example, it may be that the Spielberger questionnaires used
to measure (trait and state) anxiety have contributed to the
anxiety and irritation that participants experienced. If so, this
could explain why we observe less investment in Baseline and
more in GR-Post than Bosman and van Winden.34 To check
out this potential effect, we replicated Baseline and GR-Post,
omitting the self-report measures in the lab prior to the taking
of the decision. These new treatments will be labeled Baseline-
without and GR-Post-without.
The second issue to be examined concerns the amount of
working money (stake size). In all our treatments we endowed
the participants with 15 euro as working money, to be allo-
cated to the two projects in multiples of 50 eurocent. This was
based on the 30 guilders used by Bosman and van Winden
(2005) in their global risk experiment (similar to our GR-
Post) — where participants had to allocate the money in mul-
tiples of one guilder — and an exchange rate of approximately
2 to 1. However, we have the impression that people may have
perceived the 15 euro as being of less value, and perhaps more
like 15 guilders.35 Therefore, we also replicated Baseline and
GR-Post using an endowment of 30 euro (to be allocated in
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multiples of 1 euro). These two new treatments will be labeled
Baseline-high and GR-Post-high.36
4.1. Further evidence on investment behavior
Investment behavior in the additional treatments is shown in
Fig. 6. We focus ﬁrst on Baseline-without and GR-Post-without.
There are indications of a distributional shift in the direc-
tion of BvW: a shift towards higher investment in Baseline-
without and towards lower investment in GR-Post-without,
with modal investment coinciding now at 2/3 and a less pro-
nounced difference in the frequency of full investment. As in
BvW, adding the global risk seems to negatively affect invest-
ment, albeit that the difference is not signiﬁcant in this case
(Mann–Whitney, p = 0.530).37 Thus, the additional emotion
measures applied immediately before the investment decision
seem (partly) responsible for the divergence in ﬁndings.
One ﬁnding of BvW is still missing, which is the inverted-
U shaped investment distribution (over the interval [1/3, 1]) in
case of the global risk. Interestingly, this phenomenon shows
up if we turn to the treatments with the higher stake: Base-
line-high and GR-Post-high. In GR-Post-high there is crowding
out of investment in the open interval (1/3, 1), with a remark-
able downward shift in modal investment (from 1 to 1/3),
generating a clear U-shaped investment distribution.38 With
the exception of the mode in Baseline-high being at 1/3
instead of 2/3, the results of the high treatments look very
similar to the ones obtained by BvW.
Observation 1. The measurement of emotions immediately before
the investment decision, together with a different amount of
money being at stake, seems responsible for our ﬁnding that
in contrast to BvW investment in GR-Post is not signiﬁcantly
lower than in Baseline.
4.2. Further evidence on the role of emotions
The Tobit model of investment that is successful in explain-
ing investment in Baseline and GR-Inter, but not in GR-
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Figure 6. INVESTMENT in Baseline-without, GR-Post-without and Baseline-
high, GR-Post-high
Pre and GR-Post, is again helpful for the new treatments
Baseline-high and GR-Post-high where also experienced emo-
tions were measured before the investment decision (see Appen-
dix C). In the former, the coefﬁcients of experienced hope and
anticipated rejoicing are again signiﬁcant and of very simi-
lar magnitude as in Baseline. The main difference is experi-
enced irritation, the coefﬁcient of which is no longer (weakly)
signiﬁcant. Interestingly, in contrast with GR-Post, the model
is signiﬁcant for GR-Post-high. It shows a larger and signiﬁ-
cant coefﬁcient for anticipated rejoicing. While the coefﬁcient
of experienced irritation is again positive and has kept almost
exactly the same size, its signiﬁcance has dropped to the 20%
level. Apparently, the larger stake in these treatments dimin-
ishes the role of irritation.
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Because we do not ﬁnd clear statistical evidence of a differ-
ence in the investment distributions of the respective high
and lower stake treatments, we further mention the regres-
sion results of grouping the observations from the lower and
higher stakes treatments, labeled Baseline-grouped and GR-
Post-grouped. Both models are highly signiﬁcant (prob >
χ2 =0.000). Regarding Baseline-grouped we ﬁnd similar coefﬁ-
cients as before for experienced hope and anticipated rejoic-
ing (hope: 0.220, p = 0.000; REJOICE-R: 0.097, p = 0.000),
while the coefﬁcient of experienced irritation is again insig-
niﬁcant (as in Baseline-high). For GR-Post-grouped we ﬁnd
that the coefﬁcient of anticipated rejoicing is closer to the
one obtained in Gr-Post-high (REJOICE-R: 0.127, p =0.000),
while the coefﬁcient of experienced irritation is as before, but
is now clearly signiﬁcant (irritation: 0.133, p=0.018).39
Surprisingly, so far we have not found any direct evi-
dence of an effect of (trait and state) anxiety. Neither for
trait-anxiety nor for state-anxiety differences between the
treatments are found (Kruskal–Wallis, p > 0.202).40 Only for
Baseline-grouped (now including Baseline-without) we ﬁnd a
(weakly) signiﬁcant negative correlation between trait-anxiety
and investment if, in addition, investment is categorized into
low, middle, and high investment (Spearman, −0.171, p =
0.064). Another piece of evidence, this time concerning state-
anxiety, is obtained from a linear regression with the ﬁnally
conﬁrmed (and some-times changed) investment level as depen-
dent variable and, as independent variables, INVESTMENT
and ANXIETY-2 (anxiety experienced after the investment
decision, but before conﬁrmation). Using the data of Baseline-
grouped and GR-Post-grouped, with in both cases six partic-
ipants who changed their decision, we ﬁnd for the former as
well as the latter a negative effect of ANXIETY-2.41 Interest-
ingly, the effect of state-anxiety vanishes completely if ANXI-
ETY-1, instead of ANXIETY-2, is used.
Result 7. The Tobit investment model is helpful also for explain-
ing investment in the additional treatments (Baseline-high and
GR-Post-high) and if treatments are grouped together (Baseline-
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grouped and GR-Post-grouped). The coefﬁcients of anticipated
rejoicing, experienced hope, and experienced irritation are quite
similar in Baseline, Baseline-high and Baseline-grouped, as well
as in GR-Post, GR-Post-high and GR-Post-grouped. The only
exception concerns irritation in the baseline treatments (which
loses the weak signiﬁcance it had in Baseline). Finally, using
grouped observations we also ﬁnd some weak evidence of a neg-
ative effect of trait and state anxiety on investment.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented a comprehensive study aimed at
investigating decisions under all the possible timing options of
a global risk that can not be inﬂuenced by the decision maker.
In contrast with earlier studies neither an isolation effect nor
a violation of timing independence was observed. Regarding
the latter, no statistical difference in behavior was found when
comparing the effect of a global risk being resolved before the
decision has to be made with situations where the decision
maker has to decide without yet knowing the outcome of the
global risk. Even though behavior is more or less the same
across our global risk treatments, variations in the affective
responses across treatments were found. It was argued that
these differences may very well explain the conﬂicting results
from earlier experiments.
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APPENDIX
A. EMOTION MEASURES (TRANSLATED FROM DUTCH)
A.1. State trait anxiety inventory (Spielberger et al., 1970)
A.1.1. STAI-trait
A number of statements which people have used to describe
themselves are given below. Read each statement and then
choose the appropriate number to the right of the statement
to indicate how you generally feel. There are no right or
wrong answers.
Do not spend too much time on any one statement but
give the answer which seems to describe how you generally
feel.
Almost Almost
never always
01. I feel pleasant (1) (2) (3) (4)
02. I tire quickly (1) (2) (3) (4)
03. I feel like crying (1) (2) (3) (4)
04. I wish I could be as happy
as others seem to be
(1) (2) (3) (4)
05. I am losing out on things
because I can’t make up my
mind soon enough
(1) (2) (3) (4)
06. I feel rested (1) (2) (3) (4)
07. I am “calm, cool and col-
lected”
(1) (2) (3) (4)
08. I feel that difﬁculties are pil-
ing up so that I cannot over-
come them
(1) (2) (3) (4)
09. I worry too much over
something that really doesn’t
matter
(1) (2) (3) (4)
10. I am happy (1) (2) (3) (4)
11. I am inclined to take things
hard
(1) (2) (3) (4)
12. I lack self-conﬁdence (1) (2) (3) (4)
282 ASTRID HOPFENSITZ AND FRANS A.A.M. VAN WINDEN
13. I feel secure (1) (2) (3) (4)
14. I try to avoid facing a crisis
or difﬁculty
(1) (2) (3) (4)
15. I feel blue (1) (2) (3) (4)
16. I am content (1) (2) (3) (4)
17. Some unimportant thought
runs through my mind and
bothers me
(1) (2) (3) (4)
18. I take disappointments so
keenly that I can’t put them out
of my mind
(1) (2) (3) (4)
19. I am a steady person (1) (2) (3) (4)
20. I get in a state of tension
or turmoil as I think over my
recent concerns and interests
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Note: The answers are used to calculate a value between 20
and 80, representing the anxiety trait of the subject [ANXI-
ETY-trait].
A.1.1. STAI-state
A number of statements which people have used to describe
themselves are given below. Read each statement and then
choose the appropriate number to the right of the statement
to indicate how you feel right now, that is, at this moment.
There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too
much time on any one statement but give the answer which
seems to describe your present feelings best.
Almost Almost
never always
01. I feel calm (1) (2) (3) (4)
02. I feel secure (1) (2) (3) (4)
03. I am tense (1) (2) (3) (4)
04. I am regretful (1) (2) (3) (4)
05. I feel at ease (1) (2) (3) (4)
06. I feel upset (1) (2) (3) (4)
07. I am presently worrying
over possible misfortunes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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08. I feel rested (1) (2) (3) (4)
09. I feel anxious (1) (2) (3) (4)
10. I feel comfortable (1) (2) (3) (4)
11. I feel self-conﬁdent (1) (2) (3) (4)
12. I feel nervous (1) (2) (3) (4)
13. I am jittery (1) (2) (3) (4)
14. I feel ‘high strung’ (1) (2) (3) (4)
15. I am relaxed (1) (2) (3) (4)
16. I feel content (1) (2) (3) (4)
17. I am worried (1) (2) (3) (4)
18. I feel over-excited and
‘rattled’
(1) (2) (3) (4)
19. I feel joyful (1) (2) (3) (4)
20. I feel pleasant (1) (2) (3) (4)
Note: The answers are used to calculate a value between 20
and 80, representing the anxiety state at that moment in time.
[ANXIETY-1][ANXIETY-2]
In the experiment the validated Dutch translation of the STAI
was used (van der Ploeg et al., 1980).
A.2. Regret
A.2.1. Anticipated regret and rejoicing
To which extent are the following remarks for your decision
applicable?
Not at Very much
all so
1. For project A: I did not put more
money inA, because I did notwant
to feel really bad when project B
ends well (wins). regret as motiva-
tion for project B [REGRET-B]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2. For project A: I did not put less
money in A, because I will feel
really good if project B returns
nothing (loses). rejoicing as moti-
vation for project A[REJOICE-A]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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3. For project B: I did not put less
money in B, because I will feel
really good if project B ends well
(wins). rejoicing as motivation for
project B [REJOICE-B]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
4. For project B: I did not put
more money in B, because I did
not want to feel really bad when
project B returns nothing (loses).
regret as motivation for project A
[REGRET-A]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Note: Comments in italics and brackets were not included in
the questionnaire and refer to the descriptions made in the text.
To account for relative importance of regret and rejoicing we
deﬁne:
REGRET-R=REGRET-A - REGRET-B
REJOICE-R=REJOICE-B - REJOICE-A
A.2.2. Estimated regret and disappointment
We ask you now to think about the money that you invested
in project B (no matter how much it was). Imagine that you
roll the white dice and that you get a 5. Which means that
you lost the money that you had invested in project B. How
do you feel then?
Not at Very much
all so
1. Feel powerless? (1) (2) (3) (4)
2. Feel that you should have
known better?
(1) (2) (3) (4)
3. Feel the tendency to kick
myself ?
(1) (2) (3) (4)
4. Feel the tendency to get
away from the situation?
(1) (2) (3) (4)
5. Want to undo the event? (1) (2) (3) (4)
6. Want to do nothing? (1) (2) (3) (4)
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Note: Items 2, 3, and 5 measured [REGRET-E], the remain-
ing items measured [DISAPP-E] (Zeelenberg et al., 1998).
A.2.3. Experienced regret
Please answer the following questions:
Not at Very much
all so
1. Are you disappointed by
the outcome?
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2. Do you regret your deci-
sion?
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Note: The answers give [REGRET-X] and [DISAPP-X].
A.3. Other emotions
A.3.1. Experienced emotions:
A number of statements which people have used to describe
themselves are given below. Read each statement and then
choose the appropriate number to the right of the statement
to indicate how you feel right now, that is, at this moment.
There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much
time on any one statement but give the answer which seems to
describe your present feelings best.
Not at Very much
all so
1. I feel surprised (1) (2) (3) (4)
2. I feel hopeful (1) (2) (3) (4)
3. I feel sad (1) (2) (3) (4)
4. I feel happy (1) (2) (3) (4)
5. I feel irritated (1) (2) (3) (4)
A.3.2. Importance of emotions for decision
At the end of the second questionnaire for STAI state, the fol-
lowing question was asked, to determine if subjects took emo-
tions into account when making their decision:
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Was your decision inﬂuenced by how you might feel after the
rolling of the white dice, which will determine the outcome
of project B? [EMOTION]
B. INSTRUCTIONS
Translated from the Dutch
B.1. Announcement of global risk
B.1.1. GR-Pre
Announcement earnings: At the start of phase 2 of this experi-
ment there is a chance of 1/3 that you will lose all your working
money and thus can’t earn money.
Each participant has received with this announcement a
red die. At the start of phase 2, thus before deciding about
the distribution of the working money, each participant will be
asked to roll this die a single time under supervision. If the
die shows 5 or 6, you will lose all your working money. If the
die shows 1, 2, 3 or 4, you will keep your working money.
Please note, your earnings depend on the decision that you
will take now, in phase 2, and on you keeping your working
money.
B.1.2. GR-Inter
Announcement earnings: At the start of phase 3 of this experi-
ment there is a chance of 1/3 that you will lose all your possible
earnings.
Each participant has received with this announcement a
red die. At the start of phase 3, thus before the outcome of the
projects is determined, each participant will be asked to roll
this die a single time under supervision. If the die shows 5 or
6, you will lose all your possible earnings. If the die shows 1,
2, 3 or 4, you will keep your possible earnings. Please note,
your earnings depend on the decision that you will take now,
in phase 2.
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B.1.3. GR-Post
Announcement earnings: At the end of phase 3 of this experi-
ment there is a chance of 1/3 that you will lose all your earn-
ings.
Each participant has received with this announcement a
red die. After the end of the phase 3, thus after the outcome
of the projects is determined, each participant will be asked to
roll this die a single time under supervision. If the die shows
5 or 6, you will lose all your earnings. If the die shows 1, 2, 3
or 4, you will keep your earnings. Please note, your earnings
depend on the decision that you will take now, in phase 2.
B.2. General instructions
Information about projects
In this phase you have to make a single decision concern-
ing your working money. You have to allocate the 15 euro [30
euro] that you received over two projects. These projects will
be labeled on the computer screen, when you make your deci-
sion, with the letters A and B.
In project A you will get for every euro that you put into
this project, 1 euro. Thus, project A always gives a certain
return. For the amount that you put in project B the follow-
ing holds. With probability one half (1/2) you will lose this
amount and with probability one half (1/2) you will receive
two and a half (2 1/2) times this amount. You can allocate
your working money in multiples of 50 eurocent [1 euro] over
the projects A and B in any possible combination that sums
up to 15 euro [30 euro]. The table below shows for each pos-
sible combination that you can choose the returns and corre-
sponding probabilities. All values are in euros.
B.2.1. Baseline
In the following phase, chance will determine for you the
returns of project B. Each participant has just received a
white die. In the next phase everyone will be asked to throw
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this die a single time under supervision. Also if you have put
nothing in project B, you will have to throw the die. If the die
shows 1, 2 or 3, you will receive two and a half (2 1/2) times
the amount that you put in project B. If the die shows 4, 5,
or 6, you will lose the amount that you have put in project B.
B.2.2. GR-Pre
Before you will take your decision, you will be confronted
with the risk of losing all your working money. Note: if this
happens to you we still ask you to take a decision concerning
the distribution of your working money over the projects (but
you will not be paid out the earnings from the projects).
In the following phase, chance will determine for you the
returns of project B. Each participant has just received a
white die. In the next phase everyone will be asked to throw
this die a single time under supervision. Also if you have put
nothing in project B, you will have to throw the die. If the die
shows 1, 2 or 3, you will receive two and a half (2 1/2) times
the amount that you put in project B. If the die shows 4, 5 or
6, you will lose the amount that you have put in project B.
B.2.3. GR-Inter
At the beginning of the following phase, thus after you made
your decision but before the outcome of projects is deter-
mined, you will be confronted with the risk of losing all
your earnings. Only for those that keep their possible earnings
the following will then hold: Chance will determine for you
the returns of project B. Each participant has just received a
white die. In the next phase everyone will be asked to throw
this die a single time under supervision. Also if you have put
nothing in project B, you will have to throw the die. If the die
shows 1, 2 or 3, you will receive two and a half (2 1/2) times
the amount that you put in project B. If the die shows 4, 5 or
6, you will lose the amount that you have put in project B.
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B.2.4. GR-Post
In the following phase, chance will determine for you the
returns of project B. Each participant has just received a
white die. In the next phase everyone will be asked to throw
this die a single time under supervision. Also if you have put
nothing in project B, you will have to throw the die. If the die
shows 1, 2 or 3, you will receive two and a half (2 1/2) times
the amount that you put in project B. If the die shows 4, 5
or 6, you will lose the amount that you have put in project
B. At the end of the following phase, thus after the outcome
from the projects is decided, you will be confronted with the
risk of losing all your earnings.
Money in
project A
Money in
project B
Certain
return
Chance of
1/2 for extra
earnings of
0.00 15.00 0.00 37.50
0.50 14.50 0.50 36.25
1.00 14.00 1.00 35.00
1.50 13.50 1.50 33.75
2.00 13.00 2.00 32.50
...
...
...
...
13.50 1.50 13.50 3.75
14.00 1.00 14.00 2.50
14.50 0.50 14.50 1.25
15.00 0.00 15.00 0.00
Note: Full table was presented to subjects.
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C. TABLES
TABLE V
Censored tobit regressions of investment on emotions
GR-Pre Number of obs 48
LR χ2(5) 8.08
Prob >χ2 0.152
Cox Snell R2 0.155
INVESTMENT t1 Coef. Std. Err. p> |t |
ANXIETY-trait −0.003 0.006 0.645
ANXIETY-1 −0.002 0.005 0.701
HOPE-1 0.052 0.081 0.526
IRRITATE-1 −0.037 0.081 0.649
REJOICE-R 0.080 0.034 0.024
Intercept 0.638 0.435 0.150
1 obs. left-censored; 11 obs. right-censored
GR-Post Number of obs 42
LR χ2(5) 6.40
Prob >χ2 0.269
Cox Snell R2 0.141
INVESTMENT t1 Coef. Std. Err. p> |t |
ANXIETY-trait 0.004 0.007 0.641
ANXIETY-1 −0.002 0.007 0.753
HOPE-1 0.079 0.088 0.378
IRRITATE-1 0.130 0.072 0.078
REJOICE-R 0.080 0.050 0.119
Intercept 0.137 0.446 0.761
1 obs. left-censored; 10 obs. right-censored
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TABLE VI
Censored tobit regressions of investment on emotions (treatments “high”)
Baseline-high Number of obs 39
LR χ2(5) 10.35
Prob >χ2 0.066
Cox Snell R2 0.233
INVESTMENT t1 Coef. Std. Err. p> |t |
ANXIETY-trait 0.001 0.006 0.841
ANXIETY-1 0.003 0.006 0.547
HOPE-1 0.234 0.088 0.012
IRRITATE-1 −0.014 0.099 0.891
REJOICE-R 0.108 0.042 0.014
Intercept −0.395 0.447 0.383
1 obs. left-censored; 6 obs. right-censored
GR-Post-high Number of obs 29
LR χ2(5) 23.75
Prob >χ2 0.000
Cox Snell R2 0.559
INVESTMENT t1 Coef. Std. Err. p> |t |
ANXIETY-trait −0.002 0.007 0.746
ANXIETY-1 0.000 0.006 0.999
HOPE-1 0.082 0.081 0.317
IRRITATE-1 0.133 0.101 0.200
REJOICE-R 0.153 0.028 0.000
Intercept 0.119 0.443 0.791
1 obs. left-censored; 7 obs. right-censored
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TABLE VII
Spearman correlations for anxiety, hope, and irritation
Baseline grouped ANXIETY-trait ANXIETY-1 HOPE-1
ANXIETY-1 0.539
(p=0.000)
HOPE-1 −0.237 −0.391
(p=0.039) (p=0.001)
IRRITATE-1 0.253 0.333 −0.187
(p=0.028) (p=0.003) (p=0.106)
GR-Post grouped ANXIETY-trait ANXIETY-1 HOPE-1
ANXIETY-1 0.320
(p=0.007)
HOPE-1 −0.181 0.010
(p=0.132) (p=0.932)
IRRITATE-1 0.239 0.212 −0.340
GR-Post-low (p=0.212) (p=0.178) (p=0.027)
GR-Post-high 0.246 0.153 −0.128
(p=0.116) (p=0.430) (p=0.509)
TABLE VIII
Overview of investment behavior from all treatments (t1)
N Mean:
fraction
[points] Std. dev.:
fraction
[points]
Baseline 37 0.521 [7.811] 0.226 [3.386]
Baseline-high 39 0.533 [16.00] 0.249 [7.459]
Baseline-without 43 0.584 [8.756] 0.234 [3.506]
GR-Pre 48 0.606 [9.083] 0.258 [3.865]
GR-Inter 39 0.662 [9.923] 0.274 [4.106]
GR-Post 42 0.623 [9.345] 0.273 [4.091]
GR-Post-high 29 0.554 [16.62] 0.306 [9.186]
GR-Post-without 40 0.575 [8.625] 0.253 [3.796]
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TABLE IX
Signiﬁcance levels for differences in investment
Mann–Whitney Kolm.–
Smirnov
Prob > |z| p
Baseline vs. Baseline-high 0.859 0.600
Baseline-without 0.105 0.224
GR-Pre 0.117 0.454
GR-Inter 0.011 0.012
GR-Post 0.062 0.103
GR-Post-high 0.845 0.229
GR-Post-without 0.378 0.653
Baseline-high vs. Baseline-without 0.121 0.132
GR-Pre 0.154 0.086
GR-Inter 0.025 0.031
GR-Post 0.087 0.197
GR-Post-high 0.830 0.738
GR-Post-without 0.337 0.409
Baseline-without vs. GR-Pre 0.939 0.900
GR-Inter 0.156 0.114
GR-Post 0.620 0.680
GR-Post-high 0.279 0.035
GR-Post-without 0.530 0.851
GR-Pre vs. GR-Inter 0.247 0.312
GR-Post 0.653 0.949
GR-Post-high 0.276 0.039
GR-Post-without 0.548 0.954
GR-Inter vs. GR-Post 0.495 0.676
GR-Post-high 0.129 0.026
GR-Post-without 0.103 0.161
GR-Post vs. GR-Post-high 0.196 0.092
GR-Post-without 0.341 0.699
GR-Post-high vs. GR-Post-without 0.431 0.151
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NOTES
1. Such risk concerns a speciﬁc case of “background risk” (see e.g.,
Gollier, 2001).
2. Alternatively, we could have followed the common procedure to pres-
ent this decision problem as a binary choice problem concerning the
prospects (A): (z) and (B): (2.5× z,0.5), with (B) having the higher
expected value. As will be shown below, however, this would have
obscured the fact that most participants deﬁnitely did not perceive
our problem as a binary choice problem.
3. According to Robinson and Clore (2002) self-reports are “the most
common and potentially the best way to measure a person’s emo-
tional experience.”
4. It seems that regret and rejoicing are not simply opposites of each
other (Connolly and Zeelenberg, 2002). In our experiment we will
therefore measure both emotions.
5. Only subjects that indicate that they took their emotions into
account while making their decision (represented by the variable
EMOTION in the table), are asked about anticipated regret and
rejoicing.
6. For example, the experiment as a whole may be considered as a sin-
gle dynamic choice problem or additional incentive effects may be
induced through the accumulation of earnings. Note, furthermore,
that applying a random lottery incentive procedure would in fact
change the Baseline problem to a problem of type GR-Inter (see
Cubitt et al., 1998).
7. Participants that lost were requested to remain seated till the exper-
iment was over and to answer the money allocation question hypo-
thetically.
8. Note that participants were not aware of this option when they made
their investment decision. Only very few participants changed their
investment decision (altogether 9).
9. See note 5 on the problematic nature of the latter procedure.
10. All tests in this paper are two-sided.
11. We ﬁnd no effect of age, ﬁeld of study (economics or not), and pre-
vious experience with economic experiments. In total only three sub-
jects changed their investment when they had to conﬁrm their invest-
ment decision. Therefore, in the sequel we will focus on the initial
investment decision.
12. Anticipated rejoicing was only measured for subjects responding
“yes” to EMOTION. If the answer was “no” REJOICE-R is set to
equal to 0.
13. We do not include REGRET-R because in both treatments REGRET-
R and REJOICE-R are strongly negatively correlated (Spearman:
DYNAMIC CHOICE, INDEPENDENCE AND EMOTIONS 295
−0.560;p = 0.000) and, as will be shown below, both variables can
account for the same effect.
14. The mean intensity score for HOPE-1 equals 2.946 in Baseline and
3.282 in GR-Inter (Mann–Whitney, p=0.018).
15. The mean intensity score for IRRITATE-1 (REJOICE-R) equals
1.459 (0.412) in Baseline and 1.846 (0.450) in GR-Inter. For
REGRET-R the respective values are 0.471 and 0.450. (Mann–Whit-
ney, regret: p=0.820; rejoicing: p=0.834; irritation: p=0.071)
16. ANXIETY-1-ANXIETY-trait equals 5.385 in GR-Inter vs. 0.324 in
Baseline (Mann–Whitney, p=0.043).
17. In their terminology, the “scaled-up problem” vs. the “precommit-
ment problem” and the “prior problem”, respectively.
18. Investment of those who lost and could give only hypothetical
answers is higher (mean: 0.68, std. dev: 0.27), but the difference is
not signiﬁcant (Mann–Whitney, p=0.266).
19. The distribution of ANXIETY-trait in our experiment (all treat-
ments: mean: 35.74, std. dev: 8.16) is very similar to the one
observed in a psychology experiment at the same university, involv-
ing 493 subjects (mean: 35.29, std. dev: 9.69) (t-test, p=0.569).
20. Controlling for trait-anxiety by taking the difference ANXIETY-1-
ANXIETY-trait, we ﬁnd for Baseline: 0.32, and for GR-Pre: 5.71
(Mann–Whitney, p=0.020).
21. HOPE-1 equals 2.95 in Baseline vs. 3.35 in GR-Pre (Mann–Whitney,
p=0.003).
22. In all treatments experienced happiness is approximately 2.8 (Krus-
kal–Wallis, p=0.932).
23. There is also no correlation between happiness and investment in the
other treatments (Spearman, approx. −0.02, p > 0.829). Interestingly,
though, sadness is negatively correlated with investment in GR-Pre
(Spearman, −0.379, p=0.008), whereas no correlation is observed in
the other treatments (Spearman, approx. −0.06, p>0.597).
24. If we substitute certainty equivalents at nodes and then calculate
backwards (Segal, 1990), compared to Baseline, similar investment
would be predicted for GR-Inter and for GR-Post (or possibly more
for the latter; see Bosman and van Winden, 2005). The global risk
should have no effect in GR-Inter, as is easily seen from the decision
tree. In contrast, we have observed a substantial increase in invest-
ment in GR-Inter.
25. In contrast, Bosman and van Winden (2005) ﬁnd a similar fraction
of full investment for both their baseline and “post” treatment. We
will return to this below.
26. A similar result is obtained if irritation is directly correlated with
investment (Spearman, +0.259, p=0.099).
27. See note 5.
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28. We cannot reject that REGRET-A (B) and REJOICE-A (B) are
from the same distribution across treatments (Kruskal–Wallis, p >
0.180).
29. For the correlations of estimated and experienced regret (REGRET-E
and REGRET-X) and disappointment (DISAPP-E and DISAPP-X)
we consider only participants who actually lost with project B and
survived the global risk.
30. Experienced regret and disappointment are correlated with the
amount of money the participant lost due to the negative outcome
of the relevant risk. In all treatments, if money was lost due to
the decision risk, regret is experienced (Spearman, ≈0.35, p<0.064).
For GR-Inter and GR-Post, we also ﬁnd correlations between disap-
pointment and the loss of money due to the global risk (Spearman,
≈0.55, p<0.000).
31. Regressing experienced regret on estimated regret shows a coefﬁcient
smaller than 1.
32. For completeness sake, we mention two more differences with the
design of Bosman and van Winden. First, in their study subjects
had to put the bills and coins of their endowment in two cups on
their table, whereas in our case the allocation decision was made on
the computer (and, therefore, may have been less vivid). Second, in
our GR-Post the resolution of the global risk took place in the lab,
immediately after the resolution of the decision risk, while in the
study of Bosman and van Winden this happened when participants
were (individually) paid out. Finally, remember that in our case par-
ticipants started with ﬁlling out the ANXIETY-trait questionnaire in
the reception room, before they entered the lab.
33. Cubitt et al. (1998) did not measure emotions at all, while Bosman
and van Winden only used self-reports after the investment decision.
34. Because anxiety in Baseline might lead to less risk taking, while
additional anxiety in GR-Post might have the opposite effect.
35. Even though a study by Koebberling et al. (2007) suggests no effect
of the change from guilders to euros. For empirical evidence of
money illusion, see e.g., Fehr and Tyran (2007).
36. Experimental procedures were the same as for Baseline-low and GR-
Post-low. However, in the without treatments participants did not
have to ﬁll out the ANXIETY-1 questionnaire and were not asked
about experienced emotions before they had to make their deci-
sion. In total, 151 students participated. Participants received again
2.50 euro as show-up fee, while their average earnings were 14 euro
(approximately $17) in the without treatments and 36 euro (approxi-
mately $44) in the high treatments.
37. Excluding extreme (full) investment, the difference becomes signiﬁ-
cant at the 20% level (Mann–Whitney, p = 0.166). Comparing the
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without treatments with the respective earlier treatments, we ﬁnd
weak evidence of a difference for Baseline and Baseline-without,
using a Mann–Whitney test (p=0.105).
38. Compared to the lower stake treatments, we ﬁnd weak evidence of
a difference in distributions for GR-Post and GR-Post-high, using a
Kolmogorov–Smirnov test (p=0.092).
39. The different role played by irritation across these treatments also
shows up in the fact that it is not correlated with (both trait and
state) anxiety in GR-Post-grouped whereas there is a positive corre-
lation in Baseline-grouped.
40. The difference ANXIETY-1–ANXIETY-trait is on average larger in
the high treatments (2.410 vs. 0.324 in Baseline; 2.966 vs. 0.905 in
GR-Post). This difference seems to point at some higher arousal
in the treatments with a larger stake, in line with emotion theory.
41. Regression coefﬁcients and signiﬁcance for Baseline-grouped (N =
119): investment, 0.966 (p = 0.000); ANXIETY-2, −0.002 (p = 0.000);
intercept, 0.074 (p = 0.000). Same for GR-Post-grouped (N = 111):
investment, 1.000 (p = 0.000); ANXIETY-2, −0.001 (p = 0.046); inter-
cept, 0.033, (p = 0.042). In both cases, the without treatment is
included.
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